La hermenéutica contemporánea articula un decisivo proceso de radicalización y universalización del comprender en el ámbito epistemológico y ontológico, así como del interpretar en los campos filosófico e histórico, reposicionando la categoría de sentido como eje especular. El presente artículo desarrolla, sobre las líneas generales de la hermenéutica filosófica de Gadamer (las categorías de comprensión y diálogo en el contexto de la consciencia histórico-lingüística de la existencia) la clave de �comprensión dialógica� como resultado de la lingüisticidad abierta y desplegada en (...) el mundo y en la historia como la experiencia más propia de la hermenéutica. (shrink)

For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. Romans 7.19-20.

How could the self be a substance? There are various ways in which it could be, some familiar from the history of philosophy. I shall be rejecting these more familiar substantivalist approaches, but also the non-substantival theories traditionally opposed to them. I believe that the self is indeed a substance—in fact, that it is a simple or noncomposite substance—and, perhaps more remarkably still, that selves are, in a sense, self-creating substances. Of course, if one thinks of the notion of substance (...) as an outmoded relic of prescientific metaphysics—as the notion of some kind of basic and perhaps ineffablestuff—then the suggestion that the self is a substance may appear derisory. Even what we ordinarilycall‘stuffs’—gold and water and butter and the like—are, it seems, more properly conceived of as aggregates of molecules or atoms, while the latter are not appropriately to be thought of as being ‘made’ of any kind of ‘stuff’ at all. But this only goes to show that we need to think in terms of a more sophisticated notion of substance—one which may ultimately be traced back to Aristotle's conception of a ‘primary substance’ in theCategories, and whose heir in modern times is W. E. Johnson's notion of the ‘continuant’. It is the notion, that is, of a concrete individual capable of persisting identically through qualitative change, a subject of alterable predicates that is not itself predicable of any further subject. (shrink)

John Heil's new book (Heil 2003) is remarkable in many ways. In a concise, lucid and accessible manner, it develops a complete system of ontology with many strikingly original features and then applies that ontology to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, with illuminating results. Although Heil acknowledges his intellectual debts to C. B. Martin (p. viii), he is unduly modest about his own contribution to the development and application of this novel metaphysical system. A full examination of the (...) position that Heil defends would require a book in itself, so I shall limit myself to discussing some of its central themes and to explaining a few doubts that I have concerning some aspects of it. (shrink)

Academia bases reputation and standing on the number of published articles. As a result, the abilities and potential of researchers are also being judged by the number of articles they write, as well as on the impact factor of the journals in which their articles are being published. In itself this is not a problem, although one could of course question the assumption that the quantity of the output reflects the competence of individual researchers. As Altman has stated: “The length (...) of a list of publications is a dubious indicator of ability to do good research.”1 However, if senior faculty decide that the career progress of junior researchers in academia should be based on these criteria, academic medicine is bound to fail in fulfilling its role, namely maximising the quality of medical research and doing research for the right reasons. And to some extent it already has.1 …. (shrink)

Brian Cutter (Analysis 77: 278-287, 2017) argues that one of the most prominent versions of the consequence argument—viz., Peter van Inwagen’s (An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press, 1983) ‘Third Formal Argument’—does not support an incompatibility thesis that every paradigmatic compatibilist would reject. Justin Capes (Thought 8: 50-56, 2019) concedes Cutter’s conclusion concerning van Inwagen’s Third Formal Argument and tries to meet the important challenge that Cutter issues at the end of his paper—viz., articulate a promising version of the (...) consequence argument whose conclusion is an incompatibility thesis that every paradigmatic compatibilist would reject. After arguing that Capes’s response to Cutter’s challenge fails, I meet Cutter’s challenge by presenting and discussing a version of the consequence argument that focuses on ordinary human agents in circumstances that are ordinary for human agents. (shrink)

Soon after receiving Bouvet's interpretation of the hexagrams of the I ching as binary numbers, Leibniz communicated this application of his binary arithmetic to Hans Sloane in a letter published here for the first time. The letter also included a report on the observations of the variable star in the neck of the Swan by Gottfried Kirch. Sloane sent a copy of the scientific parts of the letter to Flamsteed.

This essay explores how economic theory and historical inquiry were brought together for one of the first times in modern political thought in Books II and III of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. It shows how the theory of capital found in Book II provides a perspective for thinking about historical development and political institutions that is in sharp contrast with the historical record traced out in Book III. Smith's solution to the problem of reconciling economic theory and history lies (...) in a complex understanding of the nature of rational economic behaviour and how it has been affected by uncertainty and institutional development in human history. Embedded in Smith's political economy is not only a new theory of economic life, but a new political understanding of the importance of history to contemporary political life. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.